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Eyewitness Identification: Psychological Aspects
Abstract
Eyewitness identification refers to a type of evidence in which an eyewitness to a crime claims to recognize a
suspect as the one who committed the crime. In cases where the eyewitness knew the suspect before the
crime, issues of the reliability of memory are usually not contested. In cases where the perpetrator of the crime
was a stranger to the eyewitness, however, the reliability of the identification is often at issue. Researchers in
various areas of experimental psychology, especially cognitive and social psychology, have been conducting
scientific studies of eyewitness identification evidence since the mid-1970s. Today, there exists a large body of
published experimental research showing that eyewitness identification evidence can be highly unreliable
under certain conditions. In recent years, wrongful convictions of innocent people have been discovered
through post-conviction DNA testing; these cases show that more than 80 percent of these innocent people
were convicted using mistaken eyewitness identification evidence (Scheck, Neufeld, and Dwyer; Wells et al.,
1998). These DNA exoneration cases, along with previous analyses of wrongful convictions, point to mistaken
eyewitness identification as the primary cause of the conviction of innocent people.
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tention under the Fourth Amendment, as de-
scribed above. The resulting identification may
be deemed inadmissible ‘‘fruit’’ of the detention,
but a subsequent in-court identification will usu-
ally be admissible if the judge finds it is based on
an independent recollection of the criminal
event (United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980)).
Because an illegal arrest is not a bar to subse-
quent prosecution (Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519
(1952)), the defendant’s presence in court and
any untainted identification that occurs there is
not unconstitutional.
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN
See also CONFESSIONS; COUNSEL: RIGHT TO COUNSEL;
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS; EYE-
WITNESS IDENTIFICATION: PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS; PO-
LICE: POLICE OFFICER BEHAVIOR.
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Eyewitness identification refers to a type of
evidence in which an eyewitness to a crime claims
to recognize a suspect as the one who committed
the crime. In cases where the eyewitness knew
the suspect before the crime, issues of the reli-
ability of memory are usually not contested. In
cases where the perpetrator of the crime was a
stranger to the eyewitness, however, the reliabili-
ty of the identification is often at issue. Research-
ers in various areas of experimental psychology,
especially cognitive and social psychology, have
been conducting scientific studies of eyewitness
identification evidence since the mid-1970s.
Today, there exists a large body of published ex-
perimental research showing that eyewitness
identification evidence can be highly unreliable
under certain conditions. In recent years, wrong-
ful convictions of innocent people have been dis-
covered through post-conviction DNA testing;
these cases show that more than 80 percent of
these innocent people were convicted using mis-
taken eyewitness identification evidence (Scheck,
Neufeld, and Dwyer; Wells et al., 1998). These
DNA exoneration cases, along with previous
analyses of wrongful convictions, point to mistak-
en eyewitness identification as the primary cause
of the conviction of innocent people.
The three distinct phases of memory
Psychologists commonly partition memory
into three distinct phases. The first phase is acqui-
sition. The acquisition phase refers to processes
involved in the initial encoding of an event and
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the factors that affect the encoding. Problems in
acquisition include the effects of expectations, at-
tention, lighting, distance, arousal, and related
factors that control the types, amount, and accu-
racy of the encoded information. Eyewitnesses to
crimes often witness the event under poor condi-
tions because the event happens unexpectedly
and rapidly. Attention may be focused on ele-
ments that are of little use for later recognition
of the perpetrator, such as focusing on a weapon.
The second phase is retention. Information
that is acquired must be retained for later use.
Memory generally declines rapidly in the initial
time periods and more slowly later in what psy-
chologists describe as a negatively decelerating
curve. Importantly, new information can be ac-
quired during this slower phase and mixed to-
gether with what was previously observed to
create confusion regarding what was actually
seen by the eyewitness and what was perhaps
overheard later. Loftus’s well-known experi-
ments on misinformation, for example, show
that witnesses will use false information con-
tained in misleading questions to create what ap-
pear to be new memories that are often
dramatically different from what was actually ob-
served.
The final phase is the retrieval phase. Two
primary types of retrieval are recall and recogni-
tion. In a recall task, the witness is provided with
some context (e.g., the time frame) and asked to
provide a verbal report of what was observed. In
a recognition task, the witness is shown some ob-
jects (or persons) and asked to indicate whether
any of them were involved in the crime event.
Retrieval failures can be either errors of omission
(e.g., failing to recall some detail or failing to rec-
ognize the perpetrator) or errors of commission
(e.g., recalling things that were not present or
picking an innocent person from a lineup). Prob-
lems at any of the three phases of memory lead
to unreliability.
The distinction between estimator
variables and system variables
The scientific eyewitness identification litera-
ture has tended to rely on a distinction between
estimator variables and system variables (Wells,
1978). Estimator variables are those that affect
the accuracy of eyewitness identifications, but
cannot be controlled by the criminal justice sys-
tem. System variables also affect the accuracy of
eyewitness identifications, but the criminal jus-
tice system can control those variables. Estimator
variables tend to revolve around factors involved
in the acquisition phase, such as lighting condi-
tions, distance, arousal, the presence of weapons,
and so on. System variables tend to revolve
around factors involved in the retrieval phase,
such as the structure of a lineup, instructions
given to witnesses prior to viewing a lineup, and
so on.
The methods used in the scientific eyewit-
ness identification evidence typically involve
staging live crimes or showing video events to
people. Because the events are created by the re-
searchers, it is known with certainty who the ac-
tual ‘‘perpetrator’’ was and the performance of
eyewitnesses in picking him/her from a lineup
can be scored systematically. These eyewitnesses
can also be asked to indicate their confidence in
the identification decision, thereby permitting
analyses of the relation between confidence and
accuracy. Systematic manipulations to key vari-
ables (e.g., structure of lineup) allows for a causal
analysis of variables that affect identification ac-
curacy, eyewitness confidence, and the relation
between the two.
Estimator variables. One of the estimator
variables that has received considerable attention
is the race of the perpetrator relative to the race
of the eyewitness (Bothwell, Brigham, and Mal-
pass). A consensus now exists that it is more diffi-
cult to identify the face of a stranger from
another race than to identify the face of a strang-
er from one’s own race (Meissner and Brigham).
There appears to be an element of symmetry to
this effect. For instance, white Americans have
more difficulty identifying the faces of black
Americans than they do of other white Ameri-
cans, and black Americans have more difficulty
identifying the faces of white Americans than
they do of black Americans. The precise mecha-
nisms underlying this problem are not fully un-
derstood, although most evidence suggests that
it is largely a matter of experience rather than
prejudice. Another estimator variable that is fre-
quently cited is weapon focus. Experiments sug-
gest that the presence of a weapon draws
attention toward the weapon and away from the
weapon-holder’s face, resulting in less reliable
identification performance by eyewitnesses
(Steblay, 1992). Stress, fear, and arousal have
rarely been studied with regard to identification
evidence (as opposed to recall) and the problems
with studying these variables in an ecologically
valid manner are complex. Gender, intelligence,
and personality factors appear to be weakly, if at
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all, related to the tendency to make correct or
mistaken identifications (Cutler and Penrod).
System variables. Scientific understanding
of system variables has progressed more rapidly
than it has for estimator variables. A primary rea-
son for this is that the ‘‘payoff’’ for understand-
ing system variables may be higher than it is for
estimator variables, leading researchers to invest
more in system variable research than in estima-
tor variable research. This difference in payoff
owes to the fact that an understanding of system
variables can inform the criminal justice system
about ways to improve the accuracy of eyewitness
identification evidence.
System variable research has focused pri-
marily on four factors, namely the instructions to
eyewitnesses, the content of a lineup, the presen-
tation procedures used during the lineup, and
the behaviors of the lineup administrator. In at-
tempting to understand the importance of these
system factors, it is useful to describe briefly the
process through which mistaken identifications
seem to occur. A dominant account of the process
of eyewitness identification that has emerged is
the relative judgment process. According to this ac-
count, eyewitnesses tend to select the person
from the lineup who most closely resembles the
perpetrator relative to the other members of the
lineup. This process works reasonably well for
eyewitnesses as long as the actual perpetrator is
in the lineup. When the actual perpetrator is not
in the lineup, however, there is still someone who
looks more like the perpetrator than the remain-
ing members of the lineup, thereby luring eye-
witnesses to pick that person with surprising
frequency.
The relative judgment process leads to a
rapid understanding of why is it critical to in-
struct eyewitnesses that the actual perpetrator
might or might not be present in the lineup be-
fore showing the lineup to eyewitnesses. Experi-
ments show that failure to instruct eyewitnesses
in this manner leads to a very high rate of choos-
ing, even when the actual perpetrator is not pres-
ent (Malpass and Devine, 1981a). Proper
instructions warning the eyewitness that the per-
petrator might not be present do not eliminate
the relative judgment tendency altogether, but
they do reduce the magnitude of the problem.
Importantly, proper instructions lead eyewit-
nesses to less often mistakenly pick someone
when the perpetrator is not in the lineup, but
have little effect on their ability to pick the perpe-
trator when the perpetrator is in the lineup. The
result of proper instructions is a net improve-
ment in eyewitness identification performance
(Steblay, 1997).
The relative judgment process also has im-
plications for how investigators should select line-
up fillers. A lineup filler is a known-innocent
member of a lineup. Normally, a lineup will have
one suspect and several (five or more) fillers
whose primary purpose is to prevent the eyewit-
ness from simply guessing. If an eyewitness is
merely guessing, then odds against selecting the
suspect are N:1 (where N is the number of fill-
ers). However, if investigators use fillers who do
not fit the general description of the suspect (as
provided previously by the eyewitness) whereas
the suspect does fit that description, then the
lineup is said to be biased against the suspect. As
predicted by the relative-judgment process, line-
ups in which the fillers do not fit the description
of the perpetrator lead eyewitnesses toward pick-
ing the suspect, even if the suspect is innocent,
because the suspect most closely resembles the
perpetrator relative to the other lineup mem-
bers. Making sure that each lineup member fits
the general verbal description of the perpetrator
does not lead eyewitnesses to fail to recognize the
perpetrator when he is in the lineup, but it does
help prevent mistaken identifications of the in-
nocent suspect when the actual perpetrator is not
in the lineup (Wells, Rydell, and Seelau, 1993).
Procedures for lineups
Eyewitness researchers have called the usual
procedure for lineups the simultaneous procedure
because all members of the lineup are presented
at one time. Simultaneous procedures tend to
encourage eyewitnesses to compare one lineup
member to another lineup member and hone in
on the one who looks most like the perpetrator.
An alternative procedure, based on sequen-
tial presentation methods, was developed and
tested in 1985 (Lindsay and Wells). The sequential
procedure presents the eyewitness with one lineup
member at a time and requires the eyewitness to
make a yes/no decision on each lineup member
before viewing the next lineup member. The se-
quential procedure prevents the eyewitness from
merely making a decision as to which lineup
member looks most like the perpetrator. Al-
though eyewitnesses can compare the person
being viewed at any given time to ones viewed
previously, they cannot be sure what the next
lineup member will look like. Hence, eyewitness-
es must largely abandon the strategy of simply
picking the person who looks most like the per-
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petrator and instead compare each lineup mem-
ber to their memory of the perpetrator. The
sequential procedure has proven itself superior
to the simultaneous procedure. When the actual
perpetrator is in the lineup, the chances of select-
ing that person are nearly identical with the si-
multaneous and sequential procedures. When
the actual perpetrator is not in the lineup, on the
other hand, the simultaneous procedure pro-
duces a considerably higher rate of mistaken
identifications than does the sequential proce-
dure. As with proper instructions and proper se-
lection of fillers, the sequential procedure results
in a net improvement in eyewitness identification
performance. This result is one of the most repli-
cated findings in the eyewitness identification lit-
erature and appears to be quite robust.
A major concern of eyewitness researchers
has been the behavior of the lineup administra-
tor (Wells et al., 1998). This concern has been es-
pecially stressed with regard to photographic
lineups, which constitute the majority of initial
identifications of criminal suspects. In the United
States, courts have held that the suspect has no
right to have counsel present for photographic
identification procedures. Accordingly, photo-
graphic identification procedures are almost al-
ways administered by the case detectives with no
other observers present. The case detectives are
well aware of which lineup member is the suspect
because they are the ones who developed the sus-
pect in the first place and put the lineup togeth-
er. The experimenter expectancy effect, well
known in psychology, occurs when the person
(e.g., an experimenter) is aware of the desired re-
sponse and unintentionally (even without aware-
ness) influences the subject to give the desired
response. In a lineup situation, verbal and non-
verbal interactions between the witness and the
investigator should be of great concern because
the eyewitness is supposed to use only his or her
memory, free from external influences, to make
the decision. Recent research indicates that the
knowledge of the person administering the line-
up can influence the eyewitness to pick the
wrong person when the lineup administrator has
the wrong person as the suspect (Phillips,
McAuliff, Kovera, and Cutler). For this reason,
eyewitness researchers have argued strongly that
the person who administers the lineup should
not be aware of which person in the lineup is the
suspect. This solution is known in science as dou-
ble-blind testing and researchers have been try-
ing to get the criminal justice system to adopt this
simple but effective technique for improving the
integrity of the identification process.
Eyewitness confidence
Throughout the eyewitness identification lit-
erature there has been a great deal of interest in
the issue of eyewitness confidence. Research has
shown that the confidence of an eyewitness is the
principal determinant of whether or not jurors
will believe that an eyewitness made an accurate
identification (Lindsay, Wells, and, Rumpel).
Early research suggested that there was no rela-
tion between the confidence with which eyewit-
nesses made identifications and the accuracy of
those identifications. Later research has shown
that there is a relation between eyewitness identi-
fication confidence and accuracy, although it is
not a strong relation (Sporer, Penrod, Read, and
Cutler). Under very favorable conditions (e.g., a
good view, a fair lineup), the correlation between
confidence and accuracy is probably somewhere
around .40. For purposes of comparison, consid-
er that the correlation between a person’s height
and a person’s gender is .71. This means that
confidence is a poorer predictor of accuracy than
height is a predictor of gender. Importantly, re-
search also shows that current procedures by law
enforcement are probably harming the already-
modest relation between eyewitness identifica-
tion confidence and accuracy. Specifically, eye-
witnesses are commonly given confirming feedback
after they identify a suspect. This feedback takes
many forms, such as ‘‘Good, that’s the guy we
thought it was’’ or ‘‘You got him!’’ Research
shows that feedback of this sort to eyewitnesses
who are in fact mistaken leads the eyewitnesses
to recall that they were highly confident at the
time of the identification (Wells and Bradfield).
This confidence inflation effect is stronger for
eyewitnesses who were in fact mistaken than for
eyewitnesses who identified the actual perpetra-
tor, leading to a diminution of the confidence-
accuracy relation. This feedback problem is an-
other factor leading eyewitness researchers to
strongly advocate double-blind testing with line-
ups. Repeated questioning of eyewitnesses tends
to have similar confidence-inflating properties
such that eyewitnesses tend to become more con-
fident in their incorrect reports with repeated
questioning (Shaw and McClure). 
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Cooperation between eyewitness
researchers and the criminal justice
system
Some of the battle between eyewitness re-
search findings and the criminal justice system is
fought out in the courtroom via issues concern-
ing expert testimony by psychologists on these is-
sues. Beginning in the late 1990s, however,
elements of cooperation between eyewitness re-
searchers and the criminal justice system yielded
some success (Wells et al., 2000). A project initiat-
ed by the U.S. Department of Justice under the
auspices of the National Institute of Justice con-
vened a panel and working group of eyewitness
researchers, prosecutors, police, and defense
lawyers to develop national guidelines for law en-
forcement. These guidelines, informed by eye-
witness research findings, were published in
1999 (Technical Working Group for Eyewitness
Evidence). The guidelines include descriptions
of how eyewitnesses should be instructed prior to
viewing a lineup, how fillers should be selected
for lineups, how to conduct a sequential lineup
procedure, and warnings against giving feedback
to eyewitnesses following their identification de-
cisions. The process of including eyewitness re-
searchers in the development of these guidelines
was unique and might hold great promise for the
future of the interface between the criminal jus-
tice system and social science.
GARY L. WELLS
See also EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION: CONSTITUTIONAL
ASPECTS; SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE.
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